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Adam Smith Goes to College: An 
Economist Becomes an Academic 
Administrator 
Ronald G. Ehrenberg 
I have conducted research and taught classes on the economics of higher ed-ucation for almost 20 years. I spent the last three years as a senior central administrator and executive officer of Cornell University. A description of my 
administrative responsibilities as Vice President for Academic Programs, Planning 
and Budgeting at Cornell University can be found at my web page at 
(www.ipr.cornell.edu/RGEsPage/Ronshome.html). My experiences in this position 
opened my eyes to the use and uselessness of economic analysis in trying to help 
guide a major university and what I have learned is the focus of this essay. 
I begin by asking whether it is useful to view universities in a utility-maximizing 
framework, as I and others have done in the past. I show that the way universities 
are organized often guarantees that the utility-maximizing model is unlikely to be 
the correct approach. I then proceed to discuss a number of resource allocation 
issues that we faced at Cornell and reflect upon how concepts that are obvious to 
economists, and that we teach in principles of economics courses, helped or hin-
dered decision-making at the university. The message that I hope comes through 
is not that economic concepts are irrelevant in operating a university, but rather 
that it takes a long time to explain to all the actors in the system why they should 
matter and even longer to make them actually matter. 
Most of the discussion draws from my experiences at Cornell University. Cor-
nell is an institution that I love and that I have devoted most of my professional life 
to trying to help prosper. Hence, nothing that follows should be interpreted as a 
slap at that institution. Discussions with colleagues around the country, the won-
• Ronald G. Ehrenberg is the Irving M. Ives Professor of Industrial and Labor Relations and 
Economics, and Director of the Cornell Higher Educational Research Institute at Cornell 
University, Ithaca, New York. His e-mail address is (rge2@cornell.edu). 
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derful essay by John Siegfried (1997) on academic economists as presidents and 
provosts, and Henry Rosovsky's (1990) discussion of professors and governance at 
Harvard, suggest that my experiences at Cornell are very typical. 
Should Universities be Viewed as Utttity-Maximizing Entities? 
Starting with the work of David Garvin (1980), academic economists have used 
utility-maximizing models of behavior to try to explain the behavior of academic 
institutions. In Garvin's original work, utility functions for individual departments 
were aggregated to obtain a utility function for an institution as a whole. Depart-
ments, and hence the institution, were assumed to maximize prestige and from this 
could be derived a whole set of implications for behavior. Garvin used such a model 
to explain changing patterns of graduate program prestige, the growth of new 
graduate programs, and resource allocation across departments. 
I have used utility-maximizing models myself to explain how institutions should 
allocate scarce undergraduate financial aid dollars across different categories of 
students, and in doing so provided an early justification for what has become known 
as "preferential packaging" in the financial aid literature (Ehrenberg and Sher-
man, 1984), to explain why cutbacks in federal funding for one type of graduate 
student (for example, physical sciences) will result in changes in institutional sup-
port given to all categories of graduate students (Ehrenberg, Rees and Brewer, 
1993) and more recently to talk about the likely future of research universities 
(Ehrenberg, 1997; see also James, 1990). 
While such models are useful both in a normative sense and as analytical de-
vices, they provide little guidance as to how many decisions are actually made at 
complex universities that have multiple colleges. To see this, consider the institu-
tional structure of a typical university. The central administrative offices of the 
university include the president, provost, and all the administrative and support 
services: admissions, registrar, bursar, athletics, housing, dining, utilities, student 
services, grant administration, the campus store, information technology, telecom-
munications, libraries, and so on. Some of these services may be enterprises, which 
charge prices for their services and must at least break even. The rest of the uni-
versity is made up of the individual undergraduate colleges, professional schools 
and graduate colleges of the university. In some universities, the graduate school, 
in which Ph.D. study is undertaken, is formally a separate college. In others, grad-
uate study formally takes place in the other colleges. 
The financial relations between the center and the colleges go a long way 
towards determining if the utility-maximizing model is relevant. Revenue comes 
into the university from sources such as tuition, government appropriations, en-
dowment income, annual giving, enterprise income, research funding, continuing 
and executive education programs, and distance learning. At one extreme, all rev-
enue flows to the center, which covers all of the central costs and then allocates the 
remaining revenue out to the colleges. At the other extreme, the university operates 
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as a set of "tubs," with each college keeping all the revenue it produces and re-
mitting to the center only a sum sufficient to cover its share of the costs of the 
central administrative and support services. The latter approach is often called a 
"Responsibility Center Management" (RCM) approach to budgeting (Strauss, 
Curry and Whalen, 1996). Sometimes under a RCM model, the colleges remit to 
the center more than the funds necessary to cover their share of the administrative 
costs. The subsidy, or "franchise fee," that they send to the center can then be 
reallocated by the central administration across the colleges on a one-time or con-
tinuing basis to further institution-wide objectives. 
Fund raising for current operating funds, building support, and endowment 
is often an activity that each college pursues, although access to major donors may 
be rationed by the center which tries both to match the donors' interests with the 
colleges' needs and to stress institutional priorities. In some universities, there is a 
"tax" placed on external gifts that come into the university, either in the form of 
a share of the gift, a share of the first year income that it provides or a share of its 
endowment return. Development officers hate such taxes, which they believe dis-
courage donors from giving. Central administrators find them useful to further the 
objectives of the university, which may differ from the objectives of the donors, and 
to cover costs that gifts impose on the university as a whole. Similarly, while the 
university would like the annual giving and endowment it raises to be unrestricted 
in purpose, donors often have specific objectives in mind. To the extent that a 
donor's objective coincides with an institutional priority, the donation in practice 
proves to be unrestricted even though it goes to fund a very specific item; that is, 
it may simply free up internal funds that the institution would have used otherwise 
to be used elsewhere. 
While the above paragraphs cannot do justice to the complexity of university 
budget-making, they should make clear that a utility-maximizing model of university 
behavior is most likely to be a useful way to derive predictions about university 
behavior in those cases in which the central administration makes unilateral deci-
sions about behavior, such as undergraduate financial aid policies, and in situations 
in which the central university controls all of the revenue, or at least obtains a 
"franchise fee" from all of the tubs, and/or "captures" some fraction of the extra 
income/wealth that comes to the colleges from external donations. The utility-
maximizing model also describes fairly well the behavior of small liberal arts col-
leges, which typically lack separate centers of power. 
At my own university, the provost directly controls the budgets of only three 
of the ten colleges on the Ithaca campus. These three are the Colleges of Arts and 
Sciences, Engineering and Art, Architecture and Planning, and they are referred 
to as the "general purpose" colleges. The other seven colleges are tubs, either by 
statute (the four state-assisted statutory units at Cornell, the School of Industrial 
and Labor Relations and the Colleges of Agriculture and Life Sciences, Human 
Ecology, and Veterinary Medicine) or by trustee designation (the Schools of Law, 
Management, and Hotel Administration). Through a complicated cost-accounting 
scheme, the tubs are billed only for the average costs of the central and support 
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services provided to them, as well as for the "net" credit hours that their students 
take in the three general purpose colleges that the provost directly funds (net of 
the credit hours that the students from the general purpose colleges take in each 
of the tubs). The center also does not "tax" the annual giving and endowments 
that the tub-like colleges obtain. Not surprisingly, given these rules Cornell has 
operated historically like a system of fiefdoms, rather than one university. 
This problem is exacerbated by the method by which deans are selected. At 
Cornell, and many other universities, searches for college deans are conducted by 
committees that consist primarily of the faculty, and sometimes students and 
alumni, from the college in question. Although typically a few faculty and admin-
istrators from outside the college in question are on the committee and the presi-
dent or provost nominally picks the dean from a small group of finalists recom-
mended by the committee; in the main, it is the views of the search committee 
members that carry the day because the president and provost know from discus-
sions of each candidate's strengths and weaknesses who the committee really favors. 
Once in office, a primary role for many deans is external relations, including 
fund-raising, and they build up strong external constituent support. Hence, it is 
unlikely that a dean would be censured or fired for focusing on the goals of the 
particular college and not worrying about the overall goals of the institution. In-
deed, in many cases, once a dean is appointed, in the absence of discontent from 
the faculty and/or alumni of a college, the president and provost substantially lose 
the ability to influence a dean's behavior. For example, during the summer of 1997, 
the president of Columbia University bowed to strong criticism from alumni and 
reappointed a college dean only a few days after dismissing him (Schneider, 1997). 
Similarly, in April 1998, the president of Georgetown bowed to alumni criticism, 
which included resignations from advisory boards and the threat of withholding 
large contributions, and reversed a decision not to reappoint a popular law school 
dean. It is believed that the dean's unwillingness to share the law school's revenue 
with the university precipitated the initial decision, although this was never con-
firmed by the university (Mangan, 1998). 
Former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich (1997, pp. 150-51) had a passage in 
his recent book in which he described his reaction to attending a Cabinet meeting. 
. . . Cabinet officers have nothing in common except the first word in our 
titles . . . even the formal titles belie reality. Each of us has a special respon-
sibility for one slice of America. . . . I make a list of the real Cabinet. . . 
Secretary of the Interior—Secretary of the West 
Secretary of the Treasury—Secretary of Wall Street 
Secretary of HUD—Secretary of Big Cities 
Secretary of Agriculture—Secretary of Small Towns 
Secretary of Commerce—Secretary of Corporate America 
Secretary of Labor—Secretary of Blue-Collar America 
And so forth . . . No wonder we rarely meet. 
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If one substitutes the words "Dean of . . . " or "Vice President of . . . " for 
Reich's words "Secretary of . . . " and a college or administrative unit name for a 
cabinet department name, my sense is that his description also often applies to 
Cornell and to many other large universities.1 Hence, the notion that we can treat 
these institutions as if they are seeking to maximize a well-defined objective function 
seems farfetched in many cases. 
Indeed, inasmuch as university decision-making often consists of negotia-
tions between various units, each motivated by its own self-interests, it may well 
be productive to apply formal bargaining models to the internal behavior of 
universities, just as these models have been applied with some success to the 
internal workings of families.2 An alternative approach to understanding the 
behavior of universities that may prove useful is to think of them in the context 
of models of organizations and address how they seek to solve principal-agent 
problems between faculty and department chairs, department chairs and deans, 
and deans and central administrators, as Masten (1997, 1998) does. In future 
research I hope to use such models to provide a theory of how universities choose 
where to locate in the spectrum of centralized financial control and responsi-
bility center management and to analyze whether the choice of organizational 
form influences a university's "performance." 
I naively assumed when I agreed to help lead my university that my major 
contributions would come through my skills as an economist. While my skills as an 
economist were important, in truth, most of my major contributions depended 
upon my skills as a negotiator and mediator. Because multilateral negotiations take 
time and are likely to succeed only if, with the help of the parties, one can identify 
"win-win" situations, the number of major initiatives that an administrator can 
undertake is actually quite limited. The most frustrating lesson that I had to learn, 
which should have been obvious to an economist, was that constraints on my time 
limited what I could achieve as an administrator. 
The Uses or Uselessness of Economics in University 
Decision-Making 
Relative Prices Should Matter 
Cornell has long been an institution that is known for its strengths in the 
physical sciences and engineering. The cost of conducting research in these areas 
has increased substantially as researchers have come to rely more on high technol-
1
 Rojas (1998) presents case studies of resource allocation at six unidentified private research universities 
that reinforce this sense. 
2
 See, for example, McElroy (1990) and Lundberg and Pollak (1996). A key application of such models 
is in explaining household formation and divorce. Only rarely do individual colleges within a university 
contemplate separating from the larger university and only slightly more frequentiy do we see mergers 
of independent colleges. 
104 Journal of Economic Perspectives 
ogy laboratories, as the federal government has cut back on permissible indirect 
cost recoveries and exerted increased pressure for matching funds as part of grant 
proposals, and as the start-up funds needed to attract young physical scientists and 
engineers have increased dramatically.3 
One of the first things that economists teach undergraduate students is that 
relative prices matter and that as the relative price of something increases, one 
should substitute away from that commodity. Hence, it appeared quite obvious to 
me that, to the extent that the increased relative cost of the physical sciences and 
engineering is permanent, unless the marginal importance to the university of be-
ing preeminent in the physical sciences and engineering had also risen relative to 
the marginal importance of our being strong in other areas, we should seriously 
consider reducing our investments in engineering and the physical sciences and 
redirecting these saved resources to other areas.4 
To even suggest this in the presence of faculty from these fields would have 
marked me as a very dangerous person in the administrative hierarchy. The notion 
of a university backing away from the areas in which it had been traditionally strong 
was not something that any physical scientist or engineer would rationally be willing 
to entertain. In fact, all of Cornell's six Nobel Prize-winning faculty during the last 
30 years had come from physics and chemistry. By an ironic twist favoring our 
physical scientists and engineers, Cornell's president and provost are both human-
ists and, given the complaints by our physical scientists and engineers that they were 
not represented at the highest levels of Cornell's central administration, I suspect 
that neither is likely to want to bear the heat of suggesting that we should contem-
plate whether maintaining Cornell's relative investments in these areas made sense. 
Just as it took a Republican, Richard Nixon, to move the United States towards 
diplomatic relations with China and a Democrat, Bill Clinton, to end welfare as we 
knew it, it is my conjecture that Cornell will have to wait for a president who comes 
from the physical sciences or engineering before serious thoughts are given to 
reducing our emphasis on these areas.5 
3
 Indirect, or overhead, costs are the expenses incurred by the university as a result of the sponsored research 
on campus that cannot be easily attributed to any specific project. These include, but are not limited to, 
research administration, depreciation, operation and maintenance of facilities and equipment, university com-
puting and libraries. Cordes (1998) shows that the average indirect cost recovery rate at leading private 
research universities fell by 1.2 percentage points between fiscal years 1991 and 1997. At Cornell's private 
colleges (those other than the four statutory colleges) in Ithaca, the rate actually fell 13.9 percentage points. 
In contrast, on average, rates at public institutions rose during the period. 
4
 It is often much harder to improve relatively weak departments than it is to maintain the strength of a 
top-rated department. A university's reputation also depends heavily on the reputation of its top de-
partments. Hence, a case can be made that it would be prudent for Cornell to reduce its investment in 
the physical sciences and engineering areas only gradually. An observant reader might note that I have 
said nothing above about the implications of the rapidly rising costs of biological research. This is because 
perceptions of the relative benefits of being strong in biology have also increased due to the growing 
importance of biomedical research and the intellectual excitement caused by recent advances in biology. 
5
 See Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) for a formal treatment of why substantial policy changes may be 
implemented by "unlikely" parties. 
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Buildings, Buildings, Buildings 
To remain preeminent in the physical sciences and engineering requires state-
of-the-art facilities. These facilities are very expensive to construct, operate and 
maintain. When our engineering dean presented a proposal to develop a new fa-
cility to do research on advanced materials, we stressed to scientists around the 
university that we probably would build only one new science building during the 
next decade, and that they had better be sure that this was the one that would be 
of most use to them. We involved scientists from around the university in extensive 
discussions and everyone concluded that this indeed was the investment in science 
infrastructure that Cornell should be undertaking. 
There is, of course, the matter of having to raise the money to put up the 
building. Furthermore, our trustees have long been aware that new buildings add 
to the operating and maintenance cost of the university. A rough estimate is that 
if the building was expected to have a total project cost of a given amount, it would 
take an equivalent endowment to provide the funds for utilities, custodial services, 
and routine and planned maintenance over the useful life of the building. This 
estimate derives from these costs averaging roughly 4 percent of the project costs 
and 4 percent is what Cornell "targets" as the annual payout, after investment 
expenses, on its endowment funds. To the extent that indirect cost recoveries could 
be used to defray some of these costs, the necessary endowment would be lower. 
However, our best estimate was that indirect cost recoveries could contribute at 
most one-third of the necessary operating and maintenance funds for the proposed 
building. This was an optimistic projection based on current indirect cost recovery 
rates, the assumption that all research space in the building would always be filled 
with funded research and that none of this research would be research that would 
have otherwise been conducted in other existing facilities. 
Cornell's trustees have long required that a plan for meeting operating and 
maintenance costs be present before construction of a building can begin. Realis-
tically, however, once a major donor has committed to funding half the cost of a 
building and it has been publicly announced that the building will be named after 
that donor, the idea that construction on the building would be held up because 
an endowment for maintenance had not been raised is a non sequitur. Further-
more, our ability to raise the additional construction costs, let alone the endowment 
for operations and maintenance, was somewhat uncertain and based upon forecasts 
of our development staff. So, while the university hoped that funds to endow a 
maintenance fund for the building will be raised, we instead planned to pay for the 
needed operating and maintenance funds that will not come out of indirect cost 
recoveries from our annual operating budgets. 
Inevitably then, this new building will compete for funds with faculty positions, 
graduate student support and faculty salaries. The very same faculty members who 
vehemently argued that the institution needed the new facilities to remain com-
petitive in the physical sciences and engineering are likely to turn around and 
chastise the administration for spending too much on buildings and not enough 
on faculty salaries, new faculty positions, and graduate student support. Proposals 
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for a moratorium on new construction will be put forth. Many faculty members 
understand the tradeoff between buildings and other costs, but apparently only 
after their unit's new building is finished. 
This highlights a general point that will also be evident in several of the 
"vignettes" that follow. The university is an institution that is dedicated to rational 
discussion and intellectual exploration. However, often faculty members' self-inter-
ests prevent or delay them from recognizing obvious truths. This tension between 
the expressed values of the university and the internal political maneuvering that 
takes place within the institution is often present. 
Faculty Salaries 
I take it as a fundamental proposition of faculty life that no matter what uni-
versity one is at, the faculty believe that faculty salaries are too low. The Cornell 
administration actually happens to believe that this is true at Cornell and is making 
a determined effort to improve this situation. We reached this conclusion by track-
ing how our faculty salaries have changed relative to our competitors' faculty salaries 
over a number of years. In judging the "appropriate level" of our faculty salaries, 
we are cognizant of the fact that housing prices are low in Ithaca relative to those 
in our nation's largest cities in which many of the nation's premier institutions of 
higher education are located. Hence, we periodically hire a firm that specializes in 
computing how executives' salaries should be changed when their firms relocate 
them to different areas to compute cost of living indices for Cornell and our com-
petitors.6 Not surprisingly, a large fraction of the difference between our faculty 
members' salaries and those of faculty at competitor institutions can be explained 
by cost of living differences. 
Faculty on our faculty budget committee, who tend not to be economists, view 
attempts to control for the cost of living as an administrative ploy to avoid raising 
their salaries sufficiently. One faculty member in a leadership position also insisted 
on comparing the faculty salaries of Cornell's endowed faculty (faculty employed 
in the private colleges at Cornell) only to the faculty salaries of faculty at other 
private universities. I patiently tried to explain to him that it is well-known that over 
the last decade the salaries of faculty at private research universities have risen 
relative to the salaries of faculty at public research universities, as states have run 
into fiscal problems and public higher education has faced competing demands for 
state funds from other public priorities like health care, welfare, and prisons (Bell, 
1997). Moreover, in virtually all of the fields in which we employ faculty in the 
private part of Cornell, 40 to 60 percent of the leading competitor departments are 
located in public institutions. I presented him with data showing that faculty mem-
bers who have left Cornell usually have gone to public institutions rather than 
private institutions and that at the new assistant professor level the public schools 
6
 The index they developed is a fixed weight index, which has well-known problems, but I have judged 
it to be about as good as can be done. See Ehrenberg and Smith (1997, p. 33), for a discussion of the 
problems inherent in fixed weight price indices. 
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are often our competitors as well. Hence, I argued that his comparisons overstated 
the amount that our faculty salaries have fallen relative to our competitors' because 
his comparisons neglected all of public higher education. These analyses fell on 
deaf ears, either because I was wrong, because since I was temporarily an adminis-
trator I was perceived as being the enemy, or because the faculty member was up 
for re-election to his leadership position and had to appear to be a militant leader 
to be re-elected.7 
We and our faculty observed that Cornell's faculty salaries are most competitive 
at the assistant professor and associate professor ranks and lag behind the compe-
tition the most at the full professor rank. This relationship is not surprising because 
it is at the former two ranks that we are competing most strenuously to attract and 
retain new and existing faculty and we have to meet the market in these circum-
stances. I dared not show the faculty committee my own research of some years ago 
that showed that the sensitivity of faculty turnover to relative salaries is higher for 
assistant professors than it is for associate professors and higher for associate pro-
fessors than it is for full professors (Ehrenberg, Rasper and Rees, 1991). In fact, 
our deans who allocate salary funds are behaving perfectly rationally when they pay 
our assistant and associate professors relatively more than they pay our full profes-
sors vis-a-vis faculty at other institutions. In effect, they are exploiting the monop-
sony power that they have over their least mobile faculty. When they face the pos-
sibility of losing a desired senior faculty member, the deans have the flexibility to 
respond with a salary adjustment. As such, our overall turnover rate for tenured 
faculty members (excluding retirements) has been less than 1.5 percent a year for 
over a decade. 
The vast majority of our faculty are full professors. The vast majority of faculty 
on our faculty budget committee are full professors. It is therefore not surprising 
that the faculty committee recommended that the salary pool that we deliver to 
them be heavily weighted towards full professors. Because of the fallout that we are 
experiencing from the end of mandatory retirement, I did not have the heart to 
tell them that such a policy may not be in the institution's best interest. 
The End of Mandatory Retirement 
Effective January 1, 1994, faculty at American colleges and universities are no 
longer subject to mandatory retirement. Studies conducted prior to that time by 
7
 There is a useful analogy here to Ashenfelter and Johnson's (1969) model of union behavior in which 
the objectives of union leaders and union members are assumed to diverge. The union members care 
about their salaries, while the leaders also care about the survival of the union and their personal political 
survival. Suppose that the union leader, after negotiating with management, realizes the "best" settle-
ment likely to be obtained is below the union members' expectations. The leader can either try to "sell" 
this settlement to the members or take a militant stance and lead them out on a strike. Since the former 
strategy leaves union leaders open to the charge of "being in bed" with management, the latter is often 
the preferred strategy for leaders who want to remain in office. This model is described in detail in 
Ehrenberg and Smith (1997). Substitute the words "professor" for "union member," "faculty leader" 
for "union leader," and "university administration" for "management" and the analogy is clear. 
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Hammond and Morgan (1991) and by Rees and Smith (1991) had suggested that 
abolition of mandatory retirement would affect primarily major research universi-
ties, where faculty members are often so tied to their work that they can not conceive 
of leaving their jobs if they are not compelled to do so. In the private part of Cornell, 
prior to the abolition of mandatory retirement, two-thirds of our faculty retired 
prior to age 70 and the other one-third retired when compelled to do so at age 70. 
Since January 1, 1994, the behavior of the former group has not changed, but the 
behavior of the latter group has. In particular, members of this group have tended 
to stay on well past age 70. 
Many of the faculty staying on beyond age 70 are among Cornell's best and 
brightest faculty and we are delighted to have them continually associated with 
the university. When they continue to draw a salary, however, the flow of new 
faculty into the university is slowed down and there is less money available to 
increase the salaries of other continuing faculty members each year. When a 
senior faculty member retires and is replaced by a lower paid assistant professor, 
the difference between the two salaries can be redistributed to other faculty in 
the form of salary increases. My calculations indicated that before the end of 
mandatory retirement, we were generating the equivalent of over a 1 percent 
salary increase for all continuing faculty each year due to retirements. An in-
crease in the age at which faculty retire will reduce the size of this "self-financ-
ing" annual salary increase pool. 
Because of these concerns, a joint faculty-administrative committee was ap-
pointed with me as chair to look into how the university should respond to the 
elimination of mandatory retirement. Our preliminary recommendations included 
that: the university should encourage faculty to use tax-sheltered retirement savings 
vehicles starting early in their life-cycle so that faculty who wanted to retire would 
have the resources to do so; the university should provide for a phased retirement 
option in which faculty members could work for up to five years half-time but 
receive full health and retirement benefits; and the university should drastically 
enhance the status of emeritus professors to help that position be seen as a desirable 
stage of a faculty member's career. We explicitly ruled out expensive buy out plans 
because evidence from a number of campuses suggests that those plans are not 
usually cost effective.8 Finally, we suggested that if people were staying in faculty 
positions longer than had been expected, the university should consider capping 
its contributions into the faculty defined contribution retirement system, either 
after a specified number of years or, as Yale and Chicago have done, after the 
university's contributions, invested in some predetermined conservative manner, 
8
 A recent retirement incentive plan at the University of California did induce substantial faculty retire-
ments (Pencavel, 1998). However, the U.C. faculty were covered by a defined benefit plan and the cost 
of "sweetening" their benefits was borne by the state retirement system, not the university. For a dis-
cussion of why it is more difficult to "encourage" retirement when faculty are covered by a defined 
contribution retirement system rather than a defined benefit system, see Appendix B of our committee's 
preliminary report, available on the web at (http://www.ipr.cornell.edu). 
Ronald G. Ehrenberg 109 
generate an annuity at least equal to a specified percentage of the faculty member's 
final salary.9 
Faculty response to our report was that the "carrots" we had proposed were 
too small; Congress had made tenure truly indefinite and we had to "buy out" their 
property rights if we wanted them to retire. Congress had given them enhanced 
rights; however, the notion that the university in its role as an employer could take 
actions to try to offset the effects of the change in the law was foreign to many of 
them. While economists who evaluate the effects of changes in federal policies such 
as the minimum wage often argue about what the magnitudes of employer re-
sponses actually are, no economist questions the right of employers to respond. In 
general, faculty do not think like economists and some faculty even asserted that if 
we tried to pursue policies to encourage voluntary retirement we would be violating 
the intent of the federal law. In fact, a provision in the bill passed by Congress in 
November 1998 to extend the Higher Education Act explicitly permits such policies 
for tenured faculty. 
The faculty response to the one "stick" in the interim report, limitations on re-
tirement contributions, is instructive. Many saw it as an attempt to cut total faculty 
compensation, even though it was explicit that any money saved would be used to 
provide benefits for emeritus faculty. Most could not comprehend that the contribu-
tion rates chosen by universities to make to their faculty members' retirement accounts 
were based on a number of assumptions including the expected age of retirement. To 
the extent that faculty are retiring later, a smaller contribution rate would be required 
to fund any desired level of annuity because the annuity would be paid out over a 
smaller number of years and because savings in the account would experience com-
pound earnings tax-free over a longer number of years. Rather, faculty saw the contri-
bution rate, rather than the implied annual pension benefit, as something that was 
due to them. Ultimately, given faculty perceptions that their salaries were too low (see 
above), we backed off this proposal in our final report.10 
Although economists use several different models to conceptualize the exis-
tence of tenure—as McPherson and Schapiro indicate in their companion paper 
in this symposium—one that I often find useful is based on Lazear's (1979) model 
of mandatory retirement. To think about this in the simplest of terms, suppose a 
faculty member's productivity is constant over the life cycle (to avoid questions of 
the relationship between productivity and age) and that the faculty member is paid 
a salary that starts below the productivity level and then rises continually with ex-
perience. Suppose also that the present value of a faculty member's salary is higher 
with this increasing salary profile than it would be if the faculty member received 
9
 The complete text of our April 1997 preliminary report is available on the web at (ht tp: / / 
www.ipr.cornell.edu). 
10
 Our November 1997 final report is also available at (http://www.ipr.cornell.edu). In May 1998, Cor-
nell's provost announced the adoption of the recommendations contained in the final report as formal 
university policy. A more complete discussion of our analyses and recommendations is found in Ehren-
berg, Matier and Fontanella (1998). 
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a salary equal to the constant productivity—assuming that the faculty member re-
tires at, say, age 70. In such a world, the faculty member has an incentive to exert 
extra effort to earn tenure and get to the point on the salary profile at which salary 
exceeds productivity. After that point, the faculty member still has an incentive to 
work hard because tenure does not guarantee any real salary and, if the faculty 
member reneges on effort, the university has the freedom to reduce salary, at least 
by the rate of inflation. In such a world, both the university and the faculty member 
are better off than they would be in a world in which salary always equaled pro-
ductivity, because the faculty member's present value of salary is higher under such 
a scheme and the university gets a greater output from the faculty member because 
of the induced extra effort. 
Of course, for this model to make sense, mandatory retirement is needed so that 
the faculty member does not receive a salary greater than productivity indefinitely. Put 
another way, for this to be an equilibrium, the present value of the faculty member's 
marginal productivity over the life cycle must just equal the present value of salary over 
the life cycle. If the retirement age goes up, then to maintain the optimality of the 
model, either the number of faculty must fall or the level or the slope of the faculty 
salary profile must diminish. You can imagine what the response of our senior faculty 
who already felt that they are underpaid would have been if I suggested to them that, 
because of the abolition of mandatory retirement, perhaps our goal should be to 
reduce senior faculty salary increases rather than increasing them.11 
Space Planning, Deferred Maintenance and Imperfect Information 
Early on in my term as an administrator, I inherited the "Sage shuffle." 
Sage Hall is a historic building on the Cornell campus that unfortunately needed 
about $3.5 million in deferred maintenance expenditures to maintain it in us-
able, but outdated, condition. Such funds are not easily found in university an-
nual operating budgets. (As one trustee said to me, students want low tuition, 
faculty want high salaries, and neither pushes for higher maintenance expen-
ditures) . Thus, at Cornell we have tended to fund deferred maintenance expen-
ditures, such as the replacement of mechanical systems, as part of major reno-
vations that modernize and improve the space within a building.12 Given the 
historic nature of Sage Hall, historic preservation organizations had made sure 
that we did not have the option of totally tearing the building down and replac-
ing it with a new one. 
Cornell's Johnson Graduate School of Management, which had outgrown its 
space, was the only college on campus thought to have the donor base needed to 
11
 See Appendix C of our preliminary report for a more complete discussion of the economics of the 
professorial employment relationship, available on the web at (http://www.ipr.cornell.edu). 
12
 Cornell's trustees have taken it upon themselves to mandate that we spend more on planned main-
tenance than we would otherwise have done. Thus, relative to many other universities our buildings are 
now in relatively good shape. Of course, the extra funds we spend maintaining the buildings could have 
gone to faculty salaries or other current operating needs. 
Adam Smith Goes to College: An Economist Becomes an Academic Administrator 111 
fund a major renovation of the building. Ultimately, a $38 million project was un-
dertaken which has now been completed. To renovate the building, we first had to 
move all of its current inhabitants (including the graduate school and a number of 
miscellaneous offices) out of the building and into other locations. A series of moves 
were set into place, which became known as "Sage shuffle" because other offices 
had to be vacated in turn to make room for those displaced from Sage Hall. When 
finished, these moves involved 26 different units and over 390 faculty and staff, as 
well as a roughly equivalent number of graduate students. Ultimately, this series of 
moves cost Cornell's current operating budget almost $5.7 million, which far ex-
ceeded what the cost of simply making the deferred maintenance expenditures 
would have been. Of course, if Cornell had opted to make the deferred mainte-
nance expenditures, rather than renovating the building, the university would have 
incurred some additional costs associated with temporarily housing residents of the 
building in other locations and would not have gained the benefits associated with 
a renovated facility. 
As we neared the end of the series of moves, one important scheduled move 
was canceled because at the last minute a unit realized that it did not make sense 
for it to locate far from the dean who financed it. This cancellation caused us to 
scramble for other options. One proposal was to take a building that had been 
promised to a second unit and to move a third unit into that building as well. There 
was excess space in the building and the third unit could have been accommodated 
with some squeezing. 
The director of the second unit came to my office and pounded his fist on 
my table, informing me that if he did not get all the space that he had been 
promised, he would resign. Because the provost told me that one of my roles 
was to solve, not create, problems for him, I swallowed hard, told the director 
that he could have the whole building and moved the third unit elsewhere. To 
do so generated much controversy, and in the process I had to " d u m p " on a 
nonacademic support unit that reported to me by moving them away from the 
center of campus. Two months later the director of the second unit was not 
reappointed by the vice president to whom he reported. In fact, the decision 
not to reappoint him had been made well in advance of the director's discussion 
with me, although he had not yet been informed. 
Information does not always flow smoothly between university administra-
tors who work for the same institution because there are too many things going 
on for them to be continually filling each other in on everything that each is 
doing. Imperfect information leads to less than optimal decisions. Conversely, 
information flows very quickly around the university whenever an administrator 
says anything, even in confidence, to any faculty member. This leads prudent 
administrators to "tell the same story" to everyone. However, since information 
flows are often less than perfect, multiple views on what the administrator said 
often arise even in this case. Thus, the optimal policy for an administrator is 
often to say nothing, even when the administrator has no desire to withhold 
information. 
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The Cost of Space 
Many observers of Cornell's financial situation have pointed to the costs asso-
ciated with all of the buildings that Cornell has constructed and must maintain as 
limiting the university's ability to hold down tuition costs and raise faculty salaries. 
Using measures such as building space per student or faculty, Cornell does have 
more space than most of its competitors. Of course, it is difficult to hold all other 
relevant factors equal when comparing building space across universities. Some 
universities house all their students in university-owned buildings while others 
house few. The mix of undergraduate and graduate teaching and research varies 
across universities. The science intensity of different universities differs. Finally, 
some universities are located in urban areas where land is expensive and others, 
such as Cornell, are located in more rural surroundings, in which land for research 
facilities is less expensive. If Cornell has "too much space," part of the reason 
undoubtedly is that many users of space are totally unaware of the costs of the space 
that they occupy and bear none of the costs of the space directly.13 
It seemed quite reasonable to me that we should attempt to compute the actual 
operating costs of the space each unit occupies. These costs would include the 
actual costs for routine and preventive maintenance, utilities and custodial services. 
Our building and grounds people tell us that to properly maintain buildings, ap-
proximately 1.5 percent of the replacement value of the building should be set 
aside each year for planned maintenance, and this too would be included in the 
cost. Certain overhead costs of buildings, including insurance and police and fire 
protection, would also have to be included. 
Such estimates would have a number of uses. At the college level, such infor-
mation would allow deans to identify the space costs associated with each of their 
departments just as they identify the number of faculty, teaching assistants, support 
personnel and other direct allocations. Deans, at least implicitly, base their alloca-
tion of faculty and other operating resources on the activity levels of their depart-
ments, such as students taught and external research funding, and having this in-
formation would allow them to do the same things with space. 
To take another example, when I was discussing moving one unit into a build-
ing that had far more space than they currently occupied, the unit was not very 
anxious to share the building with a second unit, even though it still would be 
better off in the new location than in the current location. To encourage them to 
accept a shared arrangement, I suggested to them that I could compute the cost of 
the space that I wanted the second unit to occupy and reduce the operating budget 
13
 As with most general statements about Cornell, this statement must be qualified. The designated 
colleges are billed directly for the operating and maintenance costs of their space (although planned 
maintenance is at their discretion). Statutory college costs are paid by state appropriations which to date 
have risen automatically when new construction or renovations are undertaken. Hence, the statement 
applies primarily to the endowed general purpose colleges and to individual departments and faculty 
members within each of the colleges. Faculty members with external research grants that provide for 
indirect cost recoveries are also implicitly billed for their space costs and the College of Agriculture and 
Life Sciences explicitly bills faculty for using some specialized facilities like greenhouses. 
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of the college in which the first unit was located by an equivalent amount. That is, 
I would "bill" their college for the space that they were refusing to give up in the 
new location and leave it to the college to decide whether the reduction in their 
budget would affect only the department. I had no authority to do this; however, 
faculty sometimes believe that administrators have more power than they actually 
do and my "threat" provided a strong incentive for the first unit to negotiate a 
compromise with the second, which was done. To have the ability to think syste-
matically about trading off operating and space budgets in this manner should be 
very important to universities. 
At the provost and deans' levels, such estimates are important to help the 
university understand the extent that cross-subsidies are occurring. Resource allo-
cation decisions at universities should always be based on the academic values of 
the different activities; however, the monetary benefits and costs of the activities 
provide the context in which such decisions should be made. The systematic failure 
to include space costs in the calculations will cause a university to spend too much 
on activities that are space-intensive and that have high operating and maintenance 
costs per unit of space. 
Finally, knowledge of space costs can be used to help ration space and curb 
people's appetites for space. Placing "prices" on space and permitting units to 
trade off spaces for operating budgets is likely to be an efficient way of carving out 
space and minimizing the need for new space.14 While the argument is often made 
that freeing up only one or two contiguous offices does not always do the institution 
much good, in a world in which universities must worry about providing office space 
for emeritus faculty to encourage faculty retirement, even small contractions of 
space use would be very valuable to universities. 
However, after two years of effort, I gave up trying to implement a space cost 
model for Cornell. Too many objections were raised to the details of the calculations 
that we were proposing to assure that the approach would have significant support 
to be adopted. One major set of criticisms revolved around our inability to distin-
guish whether "high cost" space was high cost because it was "high quality" or 
whether it was high cost because it was inefficiently designed. The problem could 
be addressed in theory, but was difficult to handle in practice.15 
I met with the business officers for each college and they encouraged me to 
write a statement for the weekly faculty newspaper that would educate faculty about 
the costs of space. (Given the importance of getting faculty to think about this issue, 
I still intend to do this.) They indicated, however, they would not use space cost 
14
 In this journal, Boyes and Happel (1989) describe how one economics department allocated faculty 
offices through an auction mechanism rather than by seniority or other means. The amount that faculty 
as a group have been willing to pay for offices has been used to support graduate students. 
15
 One way an economist might get around this problem would be to develop a hedonic model of space 
costs that would enable one to "price" various characteristics—wet lab, air-conditioning, double pane 
windows, and so on—and then compute and assign the implied price of each specific space. Such an 
effort was far beyond the capabilities of Cornell's data systems. 
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estimates on a regular basis, preferring instead to negotiate with departments over 
space, using a set of space standards that the university had developed long ago. 
So, for example, as a full professor I am "entitled" to an office of a certain size and 
as a vice president to an office of another size. If departments have more space 
than the standards indicate they "deserve," the college business officers can then 
negotiate with the departments for reductions. 
I took pride during my term as a central administrator that my office was 40 
percent smaller than the space standards indicated that my position entided me to 
have. One of my responsibilities was to supervise Cornell's office of space planning. 
Whenever people came to me complaining that they did not have enough space, I 
simply shrugged my shoulders and complained to them about my own allocation 
of space. I also never told the business officers that imposing fixed space to faculty 
ratios that do not change as either relative costs change, or as the budget constraint 
facing the university shifts, does not make a lot of sense from the perspective of an 
economist. Instead, I followed the dictum of the provost, who while a musicologist 
often thought more like an economist than I did, that if information is not going 
to be used, don't bother to incur the costs of collecting it. The marginal cost of 
developing space cost information for Cornell currently far exceed the marginal 
benefits the institution will get from collecting the information. 
Concluding Remarks 
The examples I have discussed above are only a few of the many issues that con-
front university decisionmakers in which economic models and methods can usefully 
contribute to decisions. Some of the other issues that I confronted during my term as 
a Cornell vice president in which my skills as an economist were most relevant included 
endowment spending policies; choosing among alternative ways to air-condition a cam-
pus in the face of changing environmental regulations; using internal transfer pricing 
mechanisms to facilitate academic objectives; deciding how library resources should 
be allocated; designing financial aid policies to enhance student quality and diversity; 
studying the extent to which compensation policies are gender neutral; pricing park-
ing; designing employee benefit programs; and using hedonic models to understand 
graduate program rankings and to help decide where to allocate resources. I will elab-
orate on my discussions above and discuss all of these other topics and much more in 
a forthcoming Harvard University Press book. 
I loved the time I spent as a senior central administrator at Cornell. Although one 
might not sense it from the tone of some of my remarks above, I accomplished an 
enormous amount during my administrative term. For example, I helped to integrate 
the many economics departments across the campus and improved the quality of their 
senior faculty hires, helped to create a new university-wide department of statistics, 
worked with the faculty senate to create Cornell's first university-wide faculty tenure 
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review committee, helped to establish our response to the end of mandatory retire-
ment, and helped to evaluate and redesign some of our financial aid policies.16 
To paraphrase the words of James Freedman (1996, p. 20), the best part of my 
job was that I was able to raise very fundamental issues with my colleagues in the 
administration, on the faculty, and on Cornell's Board of Trustees and to force 
them to think about these issues. They did not always respond to these issues in the 
way that I personally would have preferred, but I had the satisfaction of knowing 
that the university was thinking seriously about the situation. I enjoyed trying to 
explain simple economic concepts to my faculty and administrative colleagues and 
to push them to think about these concepts when major issues were debated. This 
is perhaps the major and unique contribution that economists can make when they 
serve as senior central administrators. 
• / am grateful to Charles Clotfelter for suggesting the title and stimulating me a decade ago 
to focus my research on higher educational issues, as well as to Michael Rothschild, Daniel 
Hamermesh, the editors and many other colleagues at Cornell and other institutions for their 
comments on earlier drafts. I am also grateful to the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and an 
anonymous donor for their support of the Cornell Higher Education Research Institute. 
16
 Much of my success as an administrator derived from faculty members' perceptions that I was one of 
them and would eventually return to my faculty position. However, if faculty members believe an ad-
ministrator's return is imminent, they will try to outlast the administrator. Hence, to maintain my effec-
tiveness, I regularly had to claim that my expected term in office was longer than I actually planned. 
Even administrators with the utmost integrity must sometimes withhold information. 
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